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The unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is emerging as an important and fastdeveloping segment in aviation (Pasztor, 2018). The UAS, with its operational
flexibility and diverse application, is set to command a significant share of aviation
revenue (FAA, 2021c). The UAS is presently being used to inspect critical
infrastructures such as surveying railways (Bojarczak & Lesiak, 2021), roadway,
bridges (Feroz & Dabous, 2021), power lines (Bögel et al., 2020), or in emergencies
like forest fires, volcanic activity, and flash floods when access and mobility are
minimum (Tilburg, 2017). A large segment of UAS users are journalists (Goldberg,
2015), aviation enthusiasts gathering content or flying UAS for their recreational
purpose. The UAS is also heavily deployed by the military (Farrow, 2016) and civil
law enforcement authorities (Carr, 2021) for national security mandates. The new
generation UAS with enhanced payload capacity is being used in pandemic to carry
medicines and essential supplies (WEF Report, 2021). Overall, in the past decade,
technology has simplified the use of UAS with significant improvement in the
ability to fly more distance, onboard sensors and recording capability, increased
payload capacity, and autonomous flight mode.
The UAS has come a long way from being a small parcel of the aviation
segment to present time international sky dominance. The term drone or UAS has
found multiple interpretations. Unmanned aircraft can traverse air space in
autonomous mode or with ground control systems. The aviation regulatory
organization around the globe refers to the same as drone, remotely-piloted aircraft
systems, unmanned aerial vehicle (ICAO Cir 328 Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS; ICAO, 2011). The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) (ICAO, 1944) finds no mention of the terms as mentioned earlier used
in the context of UAS. The Chicago Convention under Article 8 only specifies
pilotless aircraft (ICAO, 1944). The article states that the operation of pilotless
aircraft needs special authorization within the contracting state's territory and
permission to fly over other territories, including fulfilling the aspects of being
insured.
The UAS regulatory landscape has not evolved at the same rate as the
technology and falls short of addressing some issues regarding UAS operations
(Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, 2021). The first of such
problems is surveillance by law enforcement authorities. Also, UAS can fly in
lower airspace which raises privacy and data protection issues that need
introspection. The data collection and information exchange amongst various
parties also need to be addressed. The Drone cargo deliveries (Lee et al., 2019) and
beyond visual range operations are in the initial stages, requiring further clarity on
payload safety, product liability, and safe aerial operations.
The regulatory aspect of the use of drones has seen a lot of debate and
discussion in recent times. The advent of the Covid-19 pandemic led to a significant
rise in the use of UAS by state authorities and private operators (Drone Industry
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Barometer 2021, 2021). The countries worldwide saw temporary ordinances and
legislations floated to cope with and permit the use of UAS in varied scenarios
(OECD/ITF, 2020). The UAS systems, as discussed above, have various usage.
However, the same has brought forth specific issues and challenges, namely
persistent surveillance, privacy, data protection, data sharing, safety, and security
of individuals and other objects in navigable airspace and on the ground. The
following issues need introspection to understand the challenges UAS brings forth
in times to come.
Purpose
The study focused on emerging challenges from the use of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems and analyzes relevant stakeholders' responses and regulatory
policies.
Method
The framework used in the study is a conceptual analysis of statutes,
policies relating to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The study has also referred to case
laws and incidents to understand the issues of privacy, safety, data protection in
aviation law. This study primarily focuses on challenges in the operation of
unmanned aircraft systems and efforts undertaken to create a secured ecosystem.
Challenges Arising From Use of Unmanned Aircraft System
Privacy
The right to privacy during UAS operations has emerged as an important
issue. The UAS's ability to operate in lower air space with excellent vertical and
horizontal mobility makes it suitable for various operations (Rule, 2015). UAS
systems have an array of gadgets and sensors to record images, sound, data (Farris,
2018). This enhanced capability with onboard aerial sensors gives rise to situational
conflict with the freedom of movement of UAS and the right to privacy of
individuals on the ground. The issue also brings into question what amounts to a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether such expectation is reasonable in the
eyes of society at large (Scharaf, 2019). The right to operate UAS also needs to pass
the test of allowing individual peaceful enjoyment of property without falling
within realms of trespass (Mathew, 2015). The conflict also arises as operators of
UAS also have freedom of mobility and record relevant data in furtherance of
liberty.
In the United States, the Constitution's Fourth Amendment (US
Constitution - Fourth Amendment, 1791) construes essential aspects concerning
privacy. The element of Aircraft surveillance was first discussed in the case of Dow
Chemicals (Dow Chemical Co. V. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). The
Environmental Protection Agency chartered a plane and took photographs of the
chemical facility without the permission of Dow chemicals. The Dow chemicals
approached the federal District Court against the following action, which held that
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the photography and search violated the 4th amendment of the constitution. The 6th
Circuit court reversed the following decision stating that images of Dow Chemical's
open facilities taken from navigable airspace did not violate the 4th amendment.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the decision of the 6th Circuit, stating that the
open fields visible from lawfully flying aircraft in navigable airspace will not
amount to a search. Hence, it will not be a violation of the 4th amendment. The
court, however, also observed that the advancement of technology and specific
flying patterns to record images with advanced equipment might lead to violation
of privacy in some instances.
In the Ciraolo case (California V. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)), the law
enforcement officials received information about illegal marijuana cultivation in
the backyard of a home. The officers could not get a clear line of sight into the
backyard due to fencing and enclosures. The officer used aircraft flying at 1000 feet
to confirm the cultivation of marijuana and, with the photographs taken from that
flight, were able to obtain a search warrant. The issue before the court was whether
there was a breach of the 4th amendment while obtaining the information for the
warrant, leading to seizure. The court opined that there must be a reasonable
expectation of privacy and that such reasonable expectation must also be reasonable
and accepted by society in general. In the present case, law enforcement officials
did not breach through the fence. Still, they improvised and received the
confirmation of marijuana cultivation by flying over the navigable airspace with a
recording device. As such, there was no expectation of not flying such a path.
Similarly, in Riley's case (Florida V. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)), the court upheld
the law enforcement authorities' observations from a helicopter that verified the
existence of illegal marijuana cultivation. In the following case, one of the judges
pointed out that the question of violation of privacy must not be based on FAA
flight height regulation but also on whether search flights are recurrent or rarity,
only being conducted for achieving a particular cause must be considered.
The Kyllo case (Kyllo V. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)) also brings out
an essential aspect of the type of payload and data, which may affect the context of
privacy. In the following case, law enforcement officials used thermal imaging
devices to understand the temperature variation to assume the possible growth of
illegal marijuana within the house. The use of thermal imaging devices to scan the
home without a judicial warrant violated the 4th amendment. In the present case,
the court observed that the image procured with the equipment was breaching the
internal privacy within the four walls of the home, which was the essential
cornerstone of privacy. With technology evolving, privacy will be further at-risk
times to come. Thus, it is necessary not to substantially use such technology without
judicial overview or sanction.
In the Jones case (United States V. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)), the use of
external payloads or devices was analyzed. In the following case, the law
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enforcement officers suspected that the accused was involved in the narcotics trade.
The law enforcement official in that belief affixed a GPS monitoring and tracking
device on the vehicle to track the movements of the Individual under investigation.
The Supreme Court held the action violated the rights protected under the Fourth
Amendment, stating that it was warrantless execution of authority and search to
substantiate the charge of narcotics trade based on location tracking. The judges
also took notice of the emergence of aspects of persistence surveillance with
technology fusion in law enforcement methodology.
The Policymakers and the Courts are continuously battling technology
advancement, payload structure, and data obtained by aerial Platforms (FAA,
2016). The core issue lies in the diffusion of instruments and their ability to extract
data. The definition of navigable airspace and the ability to fly within limits set by
federal aviation guidelines are also crucial in decision making. The unmanned
aircraft system is unique with its flexible vertical and horizontal take-off/landing
ability. The unmanned aircraft system predominately dominates the lower strata of
navigable airspace. The aspect of payload configuration has significant advances
with the ability to record images, video, audio, thermal data points. The continuous
improvements lead to longer endurance wherein the individuals can be tracked and
kept under Persistent Surveillance.
Persistent Surveillance
Persistent surveillance is a subset of privacy issues but has grave
repercussions on the rights of individuals in the context of the use of UAS by the
state (Stanley, 2014). The law enforcement agencies within the countries are
constantly upgrading their surveillance mechanisms. The surveillance manner
employed varies from situation to situation. The privacy of individuals is nonnegotiable and can be transgressed only as an exception. The concept of persistence
surveillance was initially introduced for military operations (Seymour, 2013). The
idea was not to identify the individual in question but to track individuals' forward
and backward movement from a particular place in each time segment. The
significantly advanced systems are now foraying into the civilian/commercial
domain. The aerial surveillance from unmanned aircraft systems with long
endurance will significantly impact the rights of individuals (Deller, 2021). The
idea of reasonable expectation of privacy and social acceptance will largely govern
the use of unmanned aircraft systems.
The law enforcement authorities authorized to use UAS constantly collect
data with or without a warrant. The prolonged ability of UAS to stay on station and
record individuals on the ground gives immense power in the hands of law
enforcement to hold massive data and analyze the target area without a warrant
(Brien, 2013). The probable cause or event to access the data might be vague or
uncertain, leaving scope for grave violation of freedom and privacy of individuals.
Continuous data collection and its storage make it highly susceptible to misuse. The
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law enforcement authorities may not always access the live feed of the target area.
They may come back later to review the data feed, giving access to multiple
individuals' private and personal data. With every advancement of technology, the
intrusion will get amplified, and the question that emerges is whether it is
reasonable to travel without getting tracked every moment.
The present thresholds test of what is justified use of aerial surveillance is
suitable for fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, which are significantly different in an
operational capacity. The same was highlighted when the French privacy authority
National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties (CNIL)
recently banned using UAS by police to enforce the lockdown rules stating it
exceeded the surveillance mandate (Noack, 2021).
Data Protection
The other issue to discuss in the UAS operation is data protection. There are
policy discussions across Europe, North America, and Asia on data protection. In
France, the National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties
(CNIL) issued its opinion on the ‘Global Security bill’ where it proposed the
regulation by the legislature of airborne cameras and monitor its implementation
with an independent assessment during the transition period (CNIL, 2021). The
European Union has issued the ‘Data Protection Impact Assessment Template’
(DPIA, 2019) as policy guidance for UAS operators. In Canada, UAS operators
must abide by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) (Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (S.C.
2000, C. 5), 2000). The UAS operator must take consent to collect, use or disclose
the personal information gathered and follow PIPEDA’s ten fair information
principles (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2019). The UAS, with
its diverse use in civilian and law enforcement, needs detailed protocol regarding
data recording, data transfer, data sharing, and data deletion. This new generation
UAS has enhanced accuracy in collecting personal data like body images, biometric
data, sound, locations visited. The versatility and vast operator pool make data
collection beyond the UAS operation mandate a significant risk. In privacy and data
protection issues, the risk arising from UAS operation varies from the specific
payload, type of operator, and area of UAS operation. In addition to that, the UAS
operation takes place in airspace far away from individual subjects on the ground
without their knowledge.
The issue of data protection is parallel to privacy. Law enforcement
authorities are already employing technology to scan the number plates of the
vehicles to track movement patterns of vehicles (Blitz, 2013). The data sharing and
transfers with multiple entities also call for ethical data management. If the state
authorities do not specify the mandatory deletion of data after a specific time, the
data is indefinitely stored with organizations to be accessed and used as per the
prevailing situation. If the unmanned aircraft system collects data, then access,
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deletion, and transfer protocol for such data will require clear protocols to eliminate
misuse and affix accountability.
Safety and Security Concerns
The use of UAS also brings forth the question of the safety of other aircraft
and individuals on the ground. The number of incidents of UAS incursion in
classified airspace near airports has increased significantly (Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020). The UAS collision with any aircraft with
passengers and cargo will have severe repercussions. Further, the recreational use
of drones where compliance requirements are minimal can cause nuisance and
damage due to inadvertent incidents (Konert & Kasprzyk, 2021). The identification
of UAS and protocol to deny take-off permission remotely are presently limited.
The requirement of license and training is also limited to UAS, which are classified
heavy by weight or denoted with high-risk classification. The aspect of insurance
and third-party liability needs further introspection to understand the damages
which might arise out of UAS operation (Mathews, 2015). The procedure to
ascertain the liability and identification of the operator combined with the incident
investigation process still needs significant improvements.
Aviation security protocols are of the highest standards to maintain a sterile
and incident-free environment, including recovery of UAS under emergency
conditions (ASTM F2849-10(2019), 2019). The UAS operations are unique as the
launch and recovery of most UAS are beyond the designated area presently
controlled by regulators. The UAS technology can also be modified and used by
non-state actors and extremists to cause security threats to harm sensitive
installations (Pledger, 2021). The UAS systems are at the mercy of the intentions
of the operator. Further, the UAS is dependent on a combination of onboard
systems, which might be vulnerable as the same are unencrypted. The following
may lead to hacking, jamming, interception leading to partial or complete loss of
control.
Recent Trends from UAS Ecosystem
Privacy by Design Methodology
Privacy by design is a methodology where the drone manufacturer accounts
for privacy and data protection in the design and implementation stages of the
manufacturing process of the unmanned aircraft system (Cavoukian, 2012). The
process involves including a robust design and registration process with an
understanding of privacy policies in addition to inputs of UAS controllers and
bystanders to have a compliant operation of UAS (Yao et al., 2017). Privaros is one
such framework that has been developed recently for delivery drones or guest
drones to be compliant with the privacy mandate of host airspace (Beck et al.,
2020). Privaros framework has been designed to allow hosts to specify regulations
not allowing audio/video content transmission or restricting the storage of data
when guest drones are within a defined host area, which may be an apartment,
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school, or complex. This allows smooth transition of drones and creates a privacyfriendly environment. An application like the Privaros framework helps the
user/operators be more compliant with the regulation enacted in the domain of
privacy and data protection.
Remote Identification Policy
Remote ID will act like a virtual number plate helping the operation of UAS.
The rules will allow easy identification of type, size, category, authorization, and
other essential parameters of the unmanned aircraft system. The initial step towards
making a secure unmanned aircraft system operation is to implement mandatory
remote identification (FAA, 2019b). The Remote ID types consist of a Broadcast
variant which beams radio signals from operating UAS to all the receivers, and a
networked centered variant where all users are connected via the internet to network
Remote ID service provider (ASTM F3411-19, 2019). FAA has mandated either a
standard Remote ID which is inbuilt in UAS, or a broadcast Remote ID module to
be mounted on UAS (FAA, 2021d). The FAA has not mandated a network Remote
ID variant. The manufacturers of UAS and Remote ID broadcast modules have to
fulfill FAA accepted means of compliance (FAA, 2021a) and submit the
declaration of compliance (FAA, 2021b). The European Union has issued ASD
guideline ‘prEN 4709-002 - Direct Remote Identification’ caters to the digital
identification requirements (ASD-STAN Direct Remote ID, 2021). It has also
amended requirements from Regulation (EU) 2020/1058 to include networked
centered Remote ID variant. The FAA can now assess the feasibility of introducing
the network Remote ID variant in certain clusters to study the operational efficacy
of the system.
Law Enforcement Usage - Transparency and Accountability
The use of unmanned aircraft systems by law enforcement authorities in the
context of individuals must be governed to a certain extent by the issuance of a
judicial warrant. The courts initially in case of Ciraolo (California V. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986), 1986), Riley (Florida V. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), 1989), and
Dow Chemical (Dow Chemical Co. V. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), 1986)
held that warrantless surveillance did not violate the fourth amendment.
The Kyllo case (Kyllo V. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)), examined the
use of a thermal scanner, and the court held that warrantless use of a scanner
violated the Fourth Amendment. Further in the Carpenter case (Carpenter V. United
States, 585 U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)), where the federal government obtained
cell phone records and locations to track Mr. Carpenters' movement through cell
site locator information. The court held that obtaining access to cell records in
excess of 100 days without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
The case against the Baltimore Police Department (Leaders of a Beautiful
Struggle V. Baltimore Police Department, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021)) examined
the department's use of aerial surveillance for prolonged tracking of individuals.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that persistence surveillance
and Aerial Investigation Research (AIR) data carried out by the Baltimore police
department violated the fourth amendment. Further, in Maxon’s case (Long Lake
Township V. Todd Maxon and Heather Maxon, No. 349230 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar.
18, 2021), 2021), the Michigan officials contended that Maxon’s were in violation
of existing local zoning ordinances by keeping excess junk on the property. The
Michigan officials substantiated this by photos of property obtained through drone
surveillance. The Michigan court held that person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and officials must seek a warrant for surveillance through drones. The
courts are now examining the manner of UAS use, and in coming times the law
enforcement authorities must be transparent on the use of unmanned aircraft
systems used for surveillance and take the community into confidence.
Data Access, Retention, and Deletion Policy
The authorities or drone users collecting data must have a clear policy on
accessing and retaining the data collected by unmanned aircraft systems (McNeal,
2015). Data deletion and cross-border transfer data protocols are emerging
concerns. The policy must align with local data protection guidelines applicable to
the aggregator of the data.
Risk Assessment and Audits
The drone ecosystem needs a custom risk assessment and audit system to
continuously assess and evolve the operational efficiency and align with regulatory
requirements. The Standard Practice for Compliance Audits to ASTM Standards
on Unmanned Aircraft Systems is one such guideline that sets minimum
requirements for all the parties involved in the UAS ecosystem to follow the manner
of the audit as set forth by Committee F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ASTM
F3365-19, 2019). FAA has also issued Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk
Management Policy which grants authorization, waivers, and exemption to
applicants in accordance with Safety Risk Management (SRM) Policy
Requirements (FAA ORDER 8040.6; FAA, 2019a). The JARUS guidelines on
Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) issued by Joint Authorities for
Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS) is an informative document that
requires six different Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels to be met where
operator and competent authority are part of the qualitative process (JARUS, 2019).
The drone service providers, commercial operators, and law enforcement
authorities must have such detailed assessments and audits as per the above
standards, which can be shared with the public to increase acceptance of UAS usage
in the public domain.
The drone manufacturers are looking at possible solutions to mitigate the
challenges arising from UAS operations. The operators are now looking to provide
options to shield personal identification information collected during UAS
operations by pixelation (Yu et al., 2018) and face anonymization of images
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collected (Lee et al., 2020). UAS policies for surveillance operations by law
enforcement also vary based on state legislation within the United States of
America (Smith, 2015). Law enforcement use, manner of operation, exemption
from disclosure of data collected during UAS operation needs to be balanced for
beneficial use of UAS for policing the community (Bentley, 2019). The following
aspect of national security with privacy will be tested shortly in legislative and
judicial forums. In the context of safety, the manufacturers are actively installing
the geofencing systems (Torens et al., 2020) to stop UAS from traversing through
restricted areas. Geofencing system helps in giving timely alerts and information to
an operator of possible imminent breach of a restricted area or proximity to
sensitive installation (Balachandran et al., 2018).
The regulators are also trying to classify UAS based on risk category,
thereby moderating compliance requirements based on the nature of UAS
operation. The recent liberalization of operation over the people rule by the Federal
Aviation Administration shows the flexibility from the regulator to help the UAS
ecosystem (Federal Register, 2021). The aspect of registration, licensing, and
compulsory marking on individual UAS is also being regulated with the
compliance deadline set for the new Remoted ID rule for manufacturers set as
September 16, 2022, and for UAS operators September 16, 2023 (FAA, 2021e).
The stakeholders recognize the Omni role capabilities of UAS in terms of data
collection. The issues about data sharing, cross border data transfer are also the
center of discussion across the globe, with the European union releasing ‘Rules and
procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft (Regulation (EU) 2019/947,
2019) mandating the protection of personal data. The security paradigm has also
received a fillip with sensitive installations coming under threat due to attacks
mounted using modified rouge UAS as a weapon platform (Congressional Research
Service, 2020). The Counter drone technology (Gettinger, 2019) and intercept
protocols are being strengthened to deal with emerging threat scenarios (Guelfi et
al., 2020). The civil aviation regulators are planning for a designated new vertiport
(NASA/NUAIR, 2021) for effective airspace management and to desist aerial
conflict with crewed flights. A vertiport will allow seamless air mobility, especially
in urban centers (NUAIR, 2021).
Conclusions
The growth and expansion of the UAS industry will continue to happen
rapidly. In consensus with stakeholders, the authorities must develop a balanced
approach to manage UAS operations in civilian airspace. Due to daily technological
advancements, there must be constant interaction with UAS manufacturers and
service providers to understand the ever-changing technology landscape. The issue
of privacy and data protection must be given due importance as the same appears
to emerge as a constant friction point given the payload-carrying ability of UAS.
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Further, the protocol related to operations and use of UAS by law enforcement must
be established to avoid violation of the liberty of individuals. There must be clear
protocols for BVLOS operation and high-risk flying categories. The Counter Drone
regulation must specify what amounts to optimum use of force and the situation
when lethal force can be used to knock out rogue UAS. The aspect of operator
liability, insurance, and third-party liability also needs introspection to consider
varied operating scenarios where the UAS operation may encounter adverse
incidents which may or may not be reported. The cargo bearing and long-haul trial
of UAS operations will bring a new set of challenges, and its operation will be
required to be integrated into the present ecosystem. The UAS industry will move
ahead, but the challenges need to be addressed in the interests of all stakeholders.
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